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Jurgen Schraepen 
V. Multivariate Regression results 
1 • Ordinary Least squares Regressions (OLS) 
In the classical linear regression model (OLS) we will run regressions 
of pooled cross-section and time-series data in the form of 
Y1 X1 X1 E1 
Y2 X2 X2 E2 
=a+ /31 ,82+···+ (5-1) 
Yn Xn Xn En 
where we will proceed by ignoring the panel structure of the data. 
Estimation of this model is straightforward and simple. We just stack 
the cross-section units and the time-series units together and find the 
pooled estimator. However, by assuming that each observation is 
identically and independently distributed (iid), we essentially ignore the 
panel structure of the data. Although this estimation method is the 
easiest, it is often biased. That is because OLS on the pooled data fails 
to use information about the heteroskedasticity that results from 
repeated observations of the same cross-section units. The problem 
with the pooled OLS estimator is that it weights all observations 
120 (514) 
equally. 
Lagrange Multiplier tests, used for detecting heteroskedasticity in 
the errors5> indicated significant heteroskedasticity6>. We will therefore 
run the OLS regressions using White's covariance matrix to compute 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. We calculate White's 
covariance matrix as 
var (/3) = Nf,~ K (X' X) - 1 ( ~ x' d,1x;1) (X' X)-1 (5-2) 
i,I 
where ~ E11XitX;1 can be expressed visually as 
i,I 
···xi··· 
···x~··· (5-3) 
0 0 : er~ ···x~··· 
The White estimator replaces the unknown er~ by ,d, where the Et 
represent the least squares residuals. In the case of heteroskedasticity, 
the conventional variance calculated as er2(X' X)-1 and therefore also 
the test statistics are not valid anymore. The white heteroskedasticity 
-consistent var(/3) provides a consistent estimator of the variance 
matrix and is useful when the real form of the heteroskedasticity is not 
known. This variance estimator is robust to heteroskedasticity within 
each cross-section but we make the important assumption that the 
disturbance variance is constant within the i groups so that E [d1] = 
er~. This form of heteroskedasticity is more general than the cross-
section heteroskedasticity in the FGLS procedure. When using FGLS as 
5) The LM heteroskedasticity test is computed by regressing the squared resid-
uals on the squared fitted values of the regression. The resulting nR' has a chi 
-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. 
6) We do not report the LM heteroskedasticity test-statistics. 
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the estimation method, each cross-section is downweighted by an 
estimate of the cross-section residual standard deviation. We will also 
estimate our model using the GLS-procedure in the section below. 
I. Regressions using one year market-adjusted returns 
Table 1: Regression results for the 1983-'97 period 
IyearMAR,= a,+ P11(Beta) ,+ p,,(E/ P) ,+ /3,,(B/ P) ,+ p.,(C/ P) ,+ Ps,(LogSize), 
+p.,(Cross) ,+ft,( YRdum83-97) ,+e, 
OLS Cross B/M C/P E/P L011Sizo Beta Aqj. R.2 ow 
(I) 
-2.108 0.143 1.8 
H.667) 
(2) -2.547 ---0.297 0.2 1.6 
H.9) (-3.503) 
(3) -2.523 ---0.302 0.08 0.2 1.8 
(-1.864) (-3.932) (0.553) 
(4) -2.857 ---0.287 ---0.175 0.618 0.203 1.8 
(-2.118) (-3.74) (-1.201) (2.95) 
(5) 05.763 ---0.284 ---0.215 0.586 2.234 0.207_ 1.8 
(-3.551) (-3.415) (-1.494) (2.852) (2.717) 
(6) -5.765 ---0.263 ---0.218 0.59 U37 0.286 0.207 1.8 
(-3.549) (-3.394) (-1.517) (2.855) (2.713) (0.368) 
(7)· 
-7.427 4.045 0.158 1.77 
(-4.526) (4.89) 
(8) -7.415 4,044 0.624 0.158 1.77 
(-4.521) (4.89) (0.798) 
(9) -2.27 0.403 0.145 1.78 
(-1.802) (2.125) 
(10) -2.786 ---0.89 0.98 0.157 1.766 
(-2.191) (-5.152) (4.401) 
(It) -7.840 ---0.893 0.862 3.663 0.889 0,171 1.754 
(-4.7) (-4.875) (4.0ft) (4.734) (1.153) 
I. OLS models are estimated with hetcroskcdasticity•robust standard errors. 
2. Year dummies are also included in the regression models but arc nol reported hcic. 
Table 1 shows the results of the multivariate OLS regressions for the 
15 year period from 1983 to 1997. The regressions on the pooled data are 
run with the lyear market adjusted individual firm stock returns as the 
dependent variable and cross-shareholding plus a range of control 
variables as the independent variables. Looking at our variable of 
interest we see that the sign of the cross-shareholding variable (Cross) 
is negative and statistically significant. Introducing beta and other firm 
-specific variables in the regression does not change the sign or the 
significancy of the cross-shareholding variable. From this evidence we 
122 (516) ~ 46 ~ 
can verify that cross-shareholding has a negative impact on the stock 
returns of the keiretsu firms. Table 2 and table 3 run the same regres-
sions but with the sample divided in the 1983-'89 and 1990-'97 period. 
When limiting our sample to the 1983-'89 period, the cross-shareholding 
variable turns out to be negative and highly significant. For the 1990-
'97 subsample, we see the Cross variable now turns slightly positive. 
After introducing the size variable into the regression the Cross vari-
able turns significantly negative again. 
Concluding from the pooled OLS regression analysis in table 1 to 3 
using the one year market adjusted returns, the cross-shareholding of 
equity seems to be negatively related to the stock returns of the 
keiretsu firms. As far as the pooled OLS regression concerns there is a 
significant return underperformance for firms with a high percentage of 
cross-shareholding. 
Table 2: Regression results for the 1983-'89 subperiod 
lyearMAR,= a,+ Pu(Beta) ,+ /3,,(E/ P) ,+/1,,(B/ P) ,+ p.,(C/ P) ,+/1,,(LogSize), 
+P.,(Cross) ,+P,( YRdum83-89) ,+e, 
OLS Cross B/M C/P E/P LogS;za Beta A~.R•2 ow 
(1) 
-8.811 0.131 2.07 
(-3.931) 
(2) -9.253 -0.783 0.222 1.97 
(-4.412) (-9.182) 
(3) -9.213 -0.784 0.154 0.221 1.97 
(--4,380) (-8.598) (0.874) 
(4) -9.824 -0.784 0.053 0.830 0.223 1.97 
(--4.554) (-8.801) (0.285) (1.581) 
(5) -8.823 -0.794 0.084 0.661 -0.631 0.2~ 1.97 
(-3.191) (-9.017) (0.323) (1.822) (-0.438) 
(6) 
-8.881 -0.789 0.044 0.885 -0.884 0.497 0.221 1.97 
(-3.198) (-8.883) (0.214) (1.821) (-0.459) (0.505) 
(7) -12.059 2.84 0.134 2.04 
(--4.08) (1.727) 
(8) -12.075 2.445 1.781 0.134 2.04 
(-4.098) (1.803) (1.53) 
(9) -8.772 0.272 0.13 2.08 
(--4.003) (0.493) 
(10) -9.354 -0.958 0.845 0.143 2.05 
(-4.29) (--4.835) (1.135) 
(II} -12.544 -1.012 0.548 2.182 2.477 0.148 2.03 
(-4.292) (-4.905) (0.932) (1.441) (2.148) 
1. OLS models are estimated with heteroskedasticity--robust standard errors. 
2. Vear dummies are also included in the regression models but are not reported here. 
II. 
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Table 3: Regression results for the 1990-'97 subperiod 
lyearMAR,= a,+ Pu(Beta) ,+ /1,,(E/ P) ,+ P,,(B/ P) ,+p.,(C/ P) ,+P.,(LogSize), 
+p.,(Cross) ,+/J,( YRdum90-97) ,+•, 
OLS Cross 8/M C/P E/P LasSize Beta Aclj. R·2 ow 
(1) 4.385 0.178 1.70 
(4.379) 
(2) 3.951 -0.182 0.287 1.75 
(3.415) (-2.798) 
(3) 4.035 -0.198 0.283 0.274 1.78 
(3.54) (-3.704) (1.9) 
(4) 3.832 -0.182 -0.03 0.532 0.281 1.78 
(3.302) (-3.404) (-0.15) (2.908) 
(5) -1.448 -0.141 -0.189 0.811 3.993 0.32" 1.8 
(-1.174) (-2.87) (-0.938) (3.54) (8.131) 
(8) -1.551 -0.143 -0.178 0.818 3.787 -2.277 0.32 1.81 
H.24) (-2.83) (-0.988) (3.583) (5.589) H.834l 
(7) -2.885 5.308 0.25 1.74 
(-2.278) (7.821) 
(8) -2.74 5.158 -1.585 0.251 1.75 
(-2.327) (7.437) (-1.188) 
(9) 4.289 0.478 0.191 1.71 
(4.31) (3.8115) 
(10) 3.935 -0.508 0.989 0.205 1.89 
(3.937) (-3.398) (5.315) 
(Ill -3.172 -0.583 0.985 5.103 -1.875 0.277 1.75 
(-2.514) (-3.184) (5.312) (7.47) H.3Bl 
I. OLS models are estimated with hetcroskcdas1icity-robust standard errors. 
2. Y car dummies an:: also included in the regression mude1s but are not reported here. 
Regressions using three year CMAR'S 
Table 4 and 5 show the results of regressing the 3year cumulative 
market adjusted returns of the individual firms on the same set of 
control variables. For the 1983-'89 period subsample in table 4 we see 
that the parameter of the cross-shareholding variable has a large 
negative sign and is statistically significant. However, introducing the 
market value of equity (or size variable) in the regression makes the 
sign of the Cross variable become smaller and insignificant. In the 1990 
-'97 period subsample in table 5 the cross-shareholding variable turns 
positive and significant. But again, the shareholding variable seems to 
proxy for firm size. Regressed together with the market value of equity, 
the sign of the Cross variable becomes negative and insignificant. 
Unfortunately, low values of the Durbin-Watson statistic (well below 
1) for the pooled OLS estimation using the 3year cumulative market 
124 (518) ~ 46 ~ ~ 4 % 
Table 4: Regression results for the 1983-'89 subperiod 
3yeatCMAR,= a,+ P,,(Betal ,+P,,(E/ Pl,+ P,,(B/ Pl,+ fJ.,(C/ Pl,+ /Js,(LogSizel, 
+ p.,(Crossl ,+ /J,( YRdum83-89l ,+ e, 
OLS Cross B/M C/P E/P Lo1Size Beta M;.ln ow 
(I) -18.978 0.14 0.795 
(-4.182) 
(2) -16.994 -0.022 0.14 0.795 
(-4.181) (-0.108) 
(3) -17.337 0.182 -1.324 0.144 0.793 
(-4.288) (0.714) (-1.988) 
(4) -18.324 0.180 -1.075 -1.555 0.15 0.799 
(-4.03) (0.702) H.53O H.543) 
(5) -6.155 0.024 -0.928 -1.159 -6.004 0.18 0.795 
(-1.283) (0.103) (-1.292) (-1.147) (-3.032) 
(8) -8.103 0.018 -0.899 -1.184 -7.98 -0.892 0.155 0.794 
(-1.289) (0.07) H.242) (-1.151) (-3.005) (-0.39) 
(7) -5.37 -8.879 0.152 0.794 
(-1.12) (-3.394) 
(8) -5.358 -8.729 -1.387 0.151 0.793 
(-1.13) (-3.315) (-0.734) 
(8) -15.852 -1.898 0.148 0.798 
(-3.942) (-1.933) 
(10) -18.379 -0.868 -1.58 0.15 0.799 
(-4.038) (-1.357) H.55) 
(II) -8.028 -0.878 -1.181 -8.018 -0.732 0.158 0.794 
H.2531 H.3481 H.1451 (-3.11) (-0.405) 
I. OLS models are estimated with heteroskedasticity.,robust standard caors. 
2. Year dummies arc also included in the n:grmion models but arc not reported here. 
Table 5: Regression results for the 1990-'97 subperiod 
3yeatCMAR,= a,+ fJ,.(Betal ,+p,,(E/ Pl,+ /1,,(B/ Pl,+ fJ.,(C/ Pl ,+/Js,(LogSizel, 
+ p.,(Crossl ,+ /J,( YRdum90-97l ,+e, 
OLS Cross B/M C/P E/P LosSize Beta Aqj. R.2 ow 
(1) 13.24 0.247 0.74 
(5,247) 
(2) 12.99 -0.111 0.252 0.74 
(5.088) (-1.418) 
(3) 13.181 -0.148 0.809 0.28 0.75 
(5,208) (-2.15) (2.591) 
(4) 13.33 -0.18 • 0.818 -0.382 0.28 0.75 
(5.284) (-2.278) (2.095) (-0.888) 
(5) 0.9 -0.08 0.483 -0.198 9.402 0.3 0.78 
(0.278) (-0.985) (1.205) (-0.415) (5.88) 
(8) 0.7 -0.086 0.487 -0.186 8.953 ·4.517 0.3 0.79 
(0.212) (-0.99) (1.18) (-0.393) (5,352) (·1.8771 
(7) 
-0.183 10.132 0.3 0.78 
(·0.08) (5.99) 
(8) 
-0.401 9.894 -4.589 0.3 0.78 
(-0.123) (5.821) (-1.703) 
(9) 13.158 0.419 0.25 0.74 
(5,201) (1.58) 
(10) 13.417 0.4 0.02 0.25 0.75 
(5.322) (1.13) (0.042) 
(11) -0.08 0.286 -0.024 9.572 ·4.331 0.3 0.79 
(-0.02) (0.773) (-0.052) (5.521) H.59) 
I. OLS models arc cst:imatcd with hctcroskedasticily-l'Obust standard cnors. 
I. Year dummies arc also included in the regression models but arc not reported here. 
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adjusted returns put into question the validity of our regressions (See 
OW-values in table 4 and 5). Values of the Durbin-Watson statistic 
lower than 2 indicate positive autocorrelation in the errors, if we make 
the assumption no misspecification in the regression is made. 
2 • Fixed effects "Within" model: Robust estimation with panel data 
Next, we will run regressions on the individual firm data set that 
combines time series and cross-sections, taking into account the panel 
structure of the data. Modeling in this setting calls for some different 
estimation techniques. 
The fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross-section 
set is that it will allow greater flexibility in modeling differences in 
behavior across individuals. In the classical regression model, 
Y;t =a+ {3xit + E;e, (5-4) 
where xit is a matrix of regressors, we talk about an "individual effect". 
The individual effect a is taken to be constant over time and specific 
to the individual cross-section unit. 
In the context of our combination of cross-section and time series 
data, we will allow a generalization of the classical regression model. 
In the fixed effects model a will be specified as a;, a group specific 
constant term in the regression model. This model assumes that differ-
ences across units can be captured in differences in the constant term. 
Thus a; is an unknown parameter to be estimated. A fixed effects 
modeF> can be illustrated like 
7 ) Greene has a good textbook exposition on estimation with panel data. 
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yit=ia;+f3Xit+1:.;1, or (5-5) 
Y1 i 0 0 a, x, x, E.1 
Yz 0 i 0 a2 X2 X2 E.2 
+ /3,+ /32+···+ (5-6) 
Yn 0 0 i <Xn Xn Xn E.n 
where i is a matrix of intercept dummy variables indicating the ith unit. 
The fixed effect estimator allows a; to differ across cross-section 
units by estimating different constants for each cross-section. It would 
be easy to perform the fixed effect estimation using the dummy vari-
ables technique (LSDV). But unfortunately, when using a large panel of 
firms, the problem of loss of degrees of freedom would be too big. For 
this reason the fixed effect panel estimation is performed using a 
different technique. The panel data procedure computes the means for 
each variable by individual and substracts this individual means from 
each variable to run a regression on these transformed data. The fixed 
effect estimator is therefore also called the within estimator. We can 
visualize this regression as follows, 
T T 
_ 1°" - 1°" y;= T"-' Yit and X;= T"-' Xit 
t= 1 /= 1 
where (5-7) 
(5-8) 
This is the estimator that would result from running OLS on the data 
including a full set of dummy variables like mentioned above. It is 
called the within estimator because it uses only the variation within 
each cross-section unit. The OLS regression on the transformed data 
yields unbiased estimates of the coefficients on the independent vari-
ables. 
The coefficient covariance matrix estimates are given by the usual 
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OLS covariance formula applied to the mean differenced model: 
var/3fix,eff. = 0-2 within (X':X:)-l 
where X represents the mean differenced X (X - X = X), and 
' 
~2 E fix.eff. E fix.eff. 
v whithin NT-N-K 
~ (y it-X' uf3fix.eff.) 
NT-N-K 
(5-9) 
(5-10) 
N represent the cross-sectional units, and T are the date periods for 
each cross-section unit. 
Since our panel data are unbalanced, NTare the total number of 
observations excluding missing values. K is the total number of esti-
mated parameters. Since we do not have the same amount of firms in 
every year to make balanced panels, we use the unbalanced panels 
approach where a simple modification in the computations of the 
standard error of the regression and the variance of the parameters is 
used to allow for unequal group sizes. 
The fixed effects themselves are not estimated directly. They are 
computed from 
(5-11) 
We will not report the different fixed effects and their standard errors, 
since they are too many (about 100 in total) to be reported. 
The least squares dummy variable approach can be extended to 
include a time-specific effect as well. The way to formulate the model 
is: 
Yu= a;+ /3Xu+ At+ Eu (5-12) 
where a simple time effect is added, existing of dummy variables. One 
of the time effects must be dropped to avoid perfect collinearity. As in 
128 (522) 
the OLS regressions, after detecting heteroskedasticity in the regres-
sion errors with the LM heteroskedasticity test, we performed estima-
tion using White's covariance matrix to compute heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariance estimates. This variance estimator is robust to a 
general form of heteroskedasticity. 
I. Regressions using one year market-adjusted returns 
Table 6, 7 and 8 show the summary statistics for the multivariate 
fixed effects panel data regressions. In the panel data estimation 
process, just like in the regressions above, the lyear market adjusted 
returns of the individual firms are regressed on the variable for cross-
shareholding and a set of variables controlling for market risk and firm 
-specific risk. 
Table 6 shows the results of the multivariate panel data regressions 
Table 6: Regression results for the 1983-'97 period 
IyearMAR,= a.,+ p,,(Beta) ,+ p,,(E/ P) ,+ /3,,(B IP),+ f:J.,(C/ P) ,+ f:J,,(LogSize), 
+ {:).,(Cross) ,+f:J,( YRdum83-97) ,+,, 
Within Cross B/M C/P E/P LogSize Sota A<!j. R"2 ow 
(1) -4,234 0.111 1.88 
(-1.46) 
(2) -2.08 -0.369 0.178 1.88 
(-0.691) (-2.714) 
(3) -2.09 -0.375 0.066 0.18 t.88 
(-0.695) (-3.027) (0.260) 
(4) -1.938 -0.301 -0.847 1.324 0.187 1.87 
(-0.625) (-Z.436) (-Z.304) (3.592) 
(5) -3,403 -0.01 -0.192 0.394 37.23 0.25 1.7 
H.024) (-0.09) (-0.55) (1.135) (6.767) 
(6) -3.39 -0.012 -0.164 0.389 37.509 -1.131 0.25 1.7 
(-1.034) (-0.103) (-0.471) (t.084) (8.842) (-0.994) 
(7) -3.547 39.1 0.25 1.7 
(-1.1) (9.57) 
(8) -3.535 39.32 -1.189 0.25 1.7 
H.107) (9.54) (-1.04) 
(9) -4.261 0.508 0.114 1.85 
(-t.467) (2.33) 
(10) -2.92 -2.002 2.301 0.157 1.842 
(-0,956) (-4.647) (5.868) 
(11) -3.445 -0.188 0.385 37.982 -1.121 0.25 1.7 
(-1.07) (-0.41) (0.984) (11.023) (-0.99) 
I. Within models are estimated with heteroskedasticity•robust standard errors. 
2. Year dummies arc also included in the regression models but are not reported here. 
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Table 7: Regression results for the 1983-'89 subperiod 
lyearMAR,= a,,+ p.,(Betal ,+/J,,(E/ Pl,+ /J,,(B/ Pl ,+p.,(C/ Pl,+ p.,(LogSizel, 
+ p.,(Crossl ,+ P,( YRdum83-B9l ,+s, 
Within Cross B/M C/P E/P LogSizo Beta A,ti.R.2 DW 
(1) 
-9.998 0.07 1.9 
(-3.394) 
(2) 
-2.778 -1.728 0.307 1.894 
(-1.743) (-9.970) 
(3) -2.783 -1.697 -0.210 0.308 1.899 
H.74) (-9.894) (-0.290) 
(4) -2.818 -1.578 -1.355 2.828 0.328 1.91 
H.834) (-9.088) H.98l (3.465) 
(5) 
-3.702 -1.184 -1.208 2.234 21.44 0.338 1.833 
(-2.245) (-5.905) (-1.781) (2.991) (3.01) 
(6) -3.623 -1.224 -1.07 2.140 22.72 -3.254 0.34 1.838 
(-2.245) (-9.001) (-1.58) (2.896) (3.165) (-t.993) 
(7) 
-9.63 81.04 0.27 1.7 
(-3.605) (9.652) 
(8) 
-6.601 62.62 -2.681 0.27 1.693 
(-3.81) (9.88) H.88) 
(9) -8.357 1.148 0.071 1.9 
(-3.387) (1.611) 
(I0) -5.08 -4.260 3.987 0.178 1.914 
(-2.88) (-9.105) (4.032) 
(11) -5.279 -2.125 2.195 52.172 -1.95 0.292 1.74 
(-3.337) (-3.144) (2.788) (8.145) H.19) 
I. Within models are es1imatcd with heteroskcdasticity-robust standard errors. 
2. Year dummies arc also ineluded in the regression models but are not reported here. 
Table 8: Regression results for the 1990-'97 subperiod 
lyearMAR,= a,.+ p,.(Betal ,+/J,,(E/ Pl,+ /J,,(B/ Pl,+ p.,(C/ Pl,+ p.,(LogSizel, 
+ p.,(Crossl ,+ P,( YRdum90-97l ,+ s, 
Within Cross B/M C/P E/P logSizo Beta A(ij. R·2 DW 
(1) -1.194 0.187 1.95 
(-0.474) 
(2) 0.178 -0.256 0.315 2.15 
(0.073) (-2.403) 
(3) 0.202 -0.289 0.384 0.324 2.14 
(0.085) (-3.22) (2.255) 
(4) 0.189 -0.278 0.213 0.202 0.323 2.14 
(0.08) (-3.828) (0.432) (0.481) 
(5) 0.858 0.08 0.728 -0.747 48.05 0.483 1.925 
(0.354) (0.813) (1.98) (-t.984) 0.933) 
(6) 0.834 0.08 0.740 -0.758 48.05 -0.788 0.462 ·1.923 
(0.344) (0.792) (2.015) (-2.011) 0.9) (-0.522) 
(7) 0.671 36.513 0.452 2.01 
(0.344) (7.82) 
(8) 0.885 36.511 -0.217 0.451 2.01 
(0.341) 0.62) (-0.132) 
(9) -1.215 0.32 ·0.192 1.951 
(-0,484) (2.275) 
(10) -0.682 -u2 1.947 0.25 1.99 
(-0.27) (-2.951) (3.88) 
(11) 0.881 0.919 -0.693 42.53 -0.95 0.481 1.98 
(0.366) (1.613) (-1.89) (14.22) (-0.641) 
I. Within models are estimated with heteroskcdasticity-robust standard errors. 
2. Y car dummies are also included in the regrasion models but are not reported here. 
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for the 15 year period from 1983 to 1997. The sign of the cross-sharehol-
ding variable is negative but not significant. This is in contrast with the 
pooled OLS regression results in table 1. Table 7 and table 8 run the 
same regressions for the 1983-'89 and 1990-'97 period subsamples. For 
the 1983-'89 subperiod, the sign of the cross-shareholding variable 
(Cross) is negative and statistically significant. Introducing beta and 
other firm-specific variables in the regression does not change the sign 
or the significancy of the cross-shareholding variable. The negative 
effect on returns for the 1983-'89 period is similar to the pooled regres-
sion results in table 2. For the 1990-'97 subsample regression in table 8, 
we find mixed evidence with the shareholding variable showing a 
positive and negative sign. The Cross variable.shows to be non-signifi-
cant in all regression models. This is contrast with the results in table 
3 where the percentage of cross-shareholding had a positive impact on 
. returns. Concluding from the panel data regression analysis in tables 6 
to 8 using the one year market adjusted returns, cross-shareholding of 
equity seems to be negatively and significantly related to the stock 
returns in the 1983-'89 period. 
II. Regressions using three year CMAR'S 
Table 9 and 10 show the panel data results of regressing the 3year 
cumulative market adjusted returns of the individual firms on the same 
set of variables. For the 1983-'89 period subsample in table 9 we see 
that the parameter of the cross-shareholding variable has a large 
negative sign and is statistically significant. However, the cross-share-
holding variable seems to capture information on firm size. Introducing 
the market value of equity (or size variable) in the regression makes the 
sign of the Cross variable become smaller and insignificant. This is 
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Table 9: Regression results for the 1983-'89 subperiod 
3yea,CMAR,= a,,+p.,(Beta),+P,,(E/P),+P,,(B/P),+p.,(C/P),+P.,(LogSize), 
+ p.,(Cross) ,+ P., ( YRdum83-89) ,+E, 
Within 
°"""' 
B/M C/P E/P Loa:Size Beta A4R0 2 ow 
(1) -12.844 0.207 1.01 
(-1.904) 
(2) 
-11.731 -0.388 G.21 1.015 
H.841 (-1.251) 
(3) -11.855 0.153 -3.82 0.231 1.034 
(-1.744) (0.447) (-3.299) 
(4) -11.18 0.218 -4.23 1.395 0.231 1.031 
(-1.737) (0.84) (-3.281) (1.158) 
(5) 
-4.991 -U73 -5.188 3.88 -135.48 0.358_ 1.127 
(-0.903) (-5.897) (-4.295) (3.081) H0.1751 
(8) ·4.845 -2.341 -4.933 3.72 -133.30 ·5.55 0.38 1.127 
(-0.758) (-5.81) (-4.091) (2.974) H0.00) (-1.81) 
(7) -12.481 -47.99 0.241 1.034 
(-1.71) (-4.83) 
(8) 
-12.393 -44.789 -5.872 0.244 1.033 
H.84) (-4.445) (-1.991) 
(9) -12.894 -1.345 0.21 1.01 
H.8851 H.22) 
(10) -11.384 -3.83 1.21 G.232 1.032 
(-1.882) (-3.289) (0.88) 
(11) -9.98 -8.958 3.824 -78.98 -3.053 0.31 1.08 
(-1.307) (·5.78) (3.025) (-7.55) H.183) 
I. Within models are estimated with hcteroskcdasticity-robust standard enors. 
2. Year dummies are also included in the ragrasion models but are not reported here. 
Table 10: Regression results for the 1990-'97 subperiod 
3yea,CMAR,= a,,+ p.,(Beta) ,+P,,(E/ P) ,+ P,,(B/ P) ,+ p.,(C/ P) ,+p.,(LogSize), 
+ /Js,(Cross) ,+ P., ( YRdum90-91) ,+E, 
Within Ctoas B/M C/P E/P logSize Beta A,ti.R"2 ow 
(1) 7.929 0.424 1.1 
(0.1) 
(2) 15.15 -0.135 0.43 1.11 
(0.198) (-1.55) 
(3) 15.3 -0.153 0.215 0.43 1.11 
(0.20) (-1.78) (0.808) 
(4) 18.08 -0.231 1.275 -1.25 0.432 1.11 
(0.211) (-U1) (1.812) (-1.58) 
(5) 1.941 -0.082 1.533 -1.73 23.145 0.44 1.11 
(0.27) (-0.547) (1.99) (-2.188) (1.84) 
(8) 19.92 -0.08 1.5 -1.7 23.15 1.828 0.438 1.11 
(0.278) (-0.525) (1.92) (-2.132) (1.94) (0.583) 
(7) 17.84 17.532 0.435 1.11 
(G.243) (U04) 
(8) 18.85 17.588 2.818 0.435 1.11 
(0.258) (2.212) (0.879) 
(9) 7.95 -0.05 0.423 1.1 
(0.1) (-0.18) 
(10) 8.888 -0.254 0.207 0.423 1.1 
(0.11) (-0.481) (0.332) 
(11) 19.44 1.32 -1.584 28.754 1.994 0.44 1.11 
(0.271) (2.00) (-2.187) (2.723) (0.8121 
J. Within models arc estimated with hcteroskcdasticity'"l'Obust standard c:mHJ. 
2. Y car dummies are also included in the regression models but are not reported here. 
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similar to the results for the pooled regressions using the 3year cumula-
tive returns in table 4. In the 1990-'97 period subsample in table 10 the 
cross-shareholding variable turns positive but loses its statistical signif-
icance. 
Similar to the regressions using the 3year cumulative market adjust-
ed returns in tables 4 and 5, tables 9 and 10 show low values for the 
Durbin-Watson statistics. Although the DW values are higher than in 
tables 4 and 5, we still can suspect positive autocorrelation in the errors. 
Since the DW statistics are well below 2 we should be cautious about 
the results in tables 9 and 10. 
Concluding from the evidence of the fixed effect panel data regres-
sions in table 6 to 10, we find evidence that higher cross-shareholding 
is related to lower stock returns in the 1983-'89 period. For the 1990-97 
period there is evidence of a positive impact but these results are not 
significant. 
2. GLS Fixed effects "Within" model: Robust estimation using 
panel data with cross-sectional heteroskedasticity 
If the disturbance variances vary within the different cross-section 
groups then we should use the FGLS (Feasible General Least Squares) 
procedure. Since in panel data using many firms it is usual to find 
heteroskedasticity, we now let the variance vary across the different 
cross-sectional units. The slope and its variance in the GLS model are 
given by, 
.B(GLS)=(X'n-1x)-1X'n-1Y 
var.B(GLS)= <$2 (X'n-1x)- 1 
wheren-1is 
(5-13) 
(5-14) 
,0,-1= 
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1 0 0 
(1~ 1 0 
(1~ 
0 (5-15) 
0 0 1 
(1~ 
dealing with groupwise heteroskedasticity, and o-~ is the square root 
of the estimated variance of the disturbance term in the ith unit. Using 
the GLS estimator, the variance-covariance matrix is smaller than the 
variance-covariance matrix of the usual OLS estimator8>. 
Next we will move on to the regression results of the GLS fixed 
effect panel data procedure, adjusting for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
mentioned above. Tables 11 and 12 show the GLS fixed effect panel 
data results of regressing the 3year cumulative returns on our variable 
of interest and a set of control variables. In tabie 11, we find the cross 
-shareholding variable (Cross) to be negative and statistically signifi-
cant. Even after introducing other control variables in the regressions, 
the percentage of cross-shareholding stays negatively related to stock 
returns. This is consistent with the results in table 4 and 7. Taking the 
evidence from the pooled OLS regressions, the fixed effect panel data 
with white's heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix, and the 
GLS fixed effect panel data regressions to adjust for groupwise heteros-
kedasticity together, we can conclude that for 
8) The GLS procedure minimizes the weighted sum of squares given by: 
1 0 0 
er~ 
E1 
1 
[E1 E2 ••• E1] 
0 
er~ 
0 E2 (5-16) 
0 0 1 
er; En 
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I. Regressions using three year CMAR'S 
Table 11: Regression results for the 1983-'89 subperiod 
3yearCMAR,= a.,+ f3u(Beta) ,+ /3,,(E/ P) ,+ /3,,(B/ P) ,+ p.,(C/ P) ,+ /1,,(LogSize), 
+p.,(Cross) +,, 
GLS Within Cross 8/M C/P E/P LogSize Sota Aqj. R"2 ow 
(1) -1.608 0.24 1.33 
(-5.357) 
(2) -1.203 -0.005 0.25 1.35 
(-3.942) (-4.321) 
(3) -1.032 0.002 -0.043 0.32 1.38 
(-3.334) (1.048) (-5.957) 
(4) -1.023 0.002 -0.044 -0.002 0.32 1.38 
(-3.294) (1.125) (-5.828) (-0.232) 
(5) -1.253 -0.011 -0.052 0.003 -0.402 0.31 1.39 
(-4.234) (-4.585) (-5.88) (0.277) (-8.944) 
(8) -1.087 -0.014 -0.05 0.002 -0.434 -0.118 0.38 · 1.4 
(-3.788) (-5.444) (-5.28) (0.174) (-7.478) (-4.304) 
(7) -1.487 0.04 0.24 1.34 
(-4.74) (1.383) 
(Bl -1.347 0.043 -0.098 0.30 1.35 
(-4.33) (1.591) (-3.89) 
(9) -1.504 -0.03 0.25 1.34 
(-4.988) (-3.447) 
(10) -0.975 -0.04 -0.004 0.31 1.37 
(-3.188) (-8.227) (-0.472) 
(11) -1.223 -0.081 0.008 -0.193 -0.08 0.34 1.38 
(-3.913) (-7.293) (0.558) (-4.82) (-3.11) 
the 1983-'89 period, there is a negative and significant relation between 
the level of cross-shareholding and stock returns for the firms in the 
keiretsu. In other words, for the 1983-'89 period we find a significant 
return underperformance for firms with a high level of cross-sharehold-
ing. 
In table 12 we present the 1990-'97 period regression results. We find 
evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation between the 
level of shareholding and the cumulative stock returns. This result 
backs up the evidence of the statistical inference in panel B of table 3 
(see page 118, P ARTl), where we found a significant difference in 
cumulative returns for the high and low cross-shareholding portfolio's. 
These results are also similar to the pooled OLS results in table 3, but 
in contrast with the panel data regressions in table 10. In tables 11 and 
12 again we have to pay attention to the Durbin-Watson statistics. 
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Since they are showing low values we must suspect positive autocor-
relation in the errors. Concluding from the regression results for the 
1990-'97 period, the evidence of a positive reiation between the level of 
cross-shareholding and cumulative stock returns is not very robust, 
especially when the low DW-statistics are taken into account. 
Table 12: Regression results for the 1990-'97 subperiod 
3yea,CMAR,= a11+p11 (Beta),+/J,,(E/P),+/J,,(B/P),+p.,(C/P),+{J.,(LogSize), 
+{J.,(Cross) +., 
GLS Within Crou B/M C/P E/P LogSize Beta Acij, R-2 ow 
(1) 1.071 0.20 1.51 
(4,167) 
(2) 0.778 -0.005 0.41 1.81 
(3,401) (-14.38) 
(3) 0.788 -0.005 0.005 0.43 1.60 
(3.326) (-14.78) (2.862) 
(4) 0.669 -0.006 0.02 -0.017 0.41 1.61 
(3,851) (-12.07) (3.21) (-2.82) 
(S) 0.874 -0.005 0.025 -0.025 0.191 0A2 1.82 
(3,534) (-S,794) (3,916) (-3.507) (2,743) 
(8) 0.085 -0.005 0.025 -0.023 0.192 0.09 0.42" 1.63 
(3.448) (-5,851) (3.794) (-3.428) (2.78) (1.64) 
(7) 0.864 o.421 0.40 1.8 
(2.904) (13.82) 
(8) 0.855 0.409 0.094 0.41 1.8 
(2.753) (13.31) (2.242) 
(9) 0.998 o.ooa o.224 1.51 
(3.864) (3.58) 
(10) 0.727 -0.032 0.04 0.267 1.52 
(3.088) (-7.18S) (8,281) 
(11) 0.72 0.014 -0.014 0.483 0.078 0,4 1.8 
(2.897) (2.275) (-2.164) (10.55) (2.09) 
VI. Conclusions and implications 
Comparing the hypotheses to the evidence from the portfolio returns, 
their significance tests and the regression analysis we can make the 
following conclusions about the relation between the level of cross-
shareholding and the long term performance of stock-returns in the 
keiretsu. 
First of all, from the evidence of the portfolio returns, we find the 
high cross-shareholding portfolio neither significantly outperforming 
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nor underperforming the market return. We can therefore not support 
the null hypothesis of abnormal returns and have to conclude that the 
purpose of cross-shareholding is not to maximize the market value of 
equity. When comparing the cumulative returns of the high and the low 
shareholding portfolio's, we find the high cross-shareholding portfolio 
significantly underperforming the low portfolio during the 1983-'89 
period, and significantly outperforming it during the 1990-'97 period. 
This contrasting evidence leads us to both supporting the null and the 
alternative hypothesis. 
From the multivariate pooled cross section-time series regressions 
we find that the level of cross-shareholding has a negative impact on 
stock returns. Regressing the cumulative returns on the level of cross-
shareholding and a set of control variables, we find that for the whole 
15 year period and for the 1983-'89 subperiod, a statistically significant 
negative relation exists between the level of cross-shareholding and 
stock returns. For the 1990-'97 period this relation seems to turn 
positive, but introducing the market value of equity into the regression 
makes the cross-shareholding variable significantly negative again. 
Choosing the unbiased fixed effect panel data procedure as our 
method of estimation, we find that for the 1983-'89 period the sign of 
the cross-shareholding variable is negative and statistically significant. 
For the 1990-'97 period the shareholding variable shows a positive sign 
but is not statistically significant. Running the same panel data regres-
sions to adjust for groupwise heteroskedasticity, again we find the 
variable for cross-shareholding to be negative and significant for the 
1983-'89 period. For the 1990-'97 period, we find evidence of a positive 
and significant relation between the level of cross-shareholding and 
cumulative stock returns. But we have to be careful to interpret these 
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latter results because of the low Durbin-Watson statistics. 
Concluding from the results in the pooled and panel data regressions, 
we find evidence that a higher level of cross-shareholding is related to 
lower stock returns in the 1983-'89 period. For the 1990-'97 period, there 
is evidence of a positive impact but these results are not robust. 
Taking all the evidence together, we can conclude that a higher level 
of cross-shareholding does not lead to higher stock returns. Firms who 
hold a high percentage of equity in other firms in the keiretsu do this 
not necessarily to maximize their market value of equity or stock 
returns. This conclusion is similar to that of N akatani (1984) who found 
that the purpose of belonging to a keiretsu is not to maximize the 
profits of the firm. 
From the evidence above we would also like to stress the importance 
of using a variable like the level of cross-shareholding. Our study has 
proved that, as far as the firms in the keiretsu are concerned, the 
percentage of cross-shareholding as an independent variable shows to 
have some explanatory power to explain stock returns. Unfortunately, 
unlike the evidence in Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991), our other 
independent variables show some contrary results. The size variable for 
example shows a large positive sign and the book-to-market ratio 
shows a contrary minus sign. Beta has almost no explanatory power, 
and the earnings yield and cash-flow yield variables show contrasting 
signs. We think that limiting the firms in our analysis to a very biased 
sample, like the firms in the keiretsu, resulted in the unexpected signs 
for the other independent variables. Nevertheless, from the evidence 
above, we believe that in empirical studies explaining Japanese stock 
returns, a variable for corporate or institutional ownership should be 
included. Since in Japanese corporate governance the ownership struc-
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ture of the firm, like the crossholding of equity or belonging to the 
keiretsu, seems to be very important, variables that can possibly 
capture these attributes are not to be disregarded. 
We leave it to further research to investigate whether the structure 
of equity ownership has also explanatory power in a bigger sample of 
Japanese firms. 
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Appendix 1: percentage of cross-shareholding in the six Japanese 
financial keiretsu 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 1997 
Mitsui 17.67 17.71 17.87 17.58 17.1 17.09 17.24 16.54 16.58 18.58 18.77 18.5 18.28 15.81 15.11 
Mitsubishi 24.39 24.91 25.18 27.44 27.8 28.87 28.44 28.89 28.37 28.33 26.11 27.54 28.94 26.78 27.31 
Sumitomo 25.D6 24.87 25.01 24.87 24.22 24.42 23.81 24.D8 24.87 24.65 24.45 23.35 22.33 22.28 22.23 
average 22.37 22.50 22.89 23.23 23.04 22.79 22.50 22.50 22.54 22.52 22.44 22.46 21.84 21.62 21.55 
Fuyo 15,74 15.72 15.79 15.81 15.81 15.29 15.31 15.44 15.82 15.82 14.9 14.81 14.12 13.87 15.52 
Sanwa 18.56 16.56 16.84 18.7 18.47 16,38 18.24 18.4 16.67 16.72 18.41 15.98 15.72 15.67 15.79 
DKB 13.72 13.87 13.33 12.74 12.49 12.24 12.03 12.08 12.18 12.19 11.92 11.72 11.5 11.24 11.29 
average 15.34 15.32 15.32 15.D8 14.88 14.84 14.53 14.63 14.82 14.84 14.41 14.10 13.78 13.59 14.20 
average of6 
18.88 18.91 19.00 19.18 18.95 18.72 18.51 18.57 18.88 18.88 18.43 18.28 17.81 17.81 17.88 keiretsu 
source : Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, Toyo Keizai (yearly dala) 
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Appendix 2: One year raw returns and descriptive statistics of 
the 4 cross-shareholding portfolio's 
Panel A: Top quartile (high cross-shareholding portfolio} 
Year N Mean Med"san Std.Dev. Var. Min. Max. 
1983 25 17.592 9.9300 28.899 723.534 -10.04 97.790 
1984 25 2.945 2.2000 13.308 177.114 -18.88 28.940 
1985 25 13.930 8.8400 27.275 743.929 -14.88 104.00 
1988 25 41.282 38.480 34.710 1204.75 -22.34 107.50 
1987 25 17.908 15.590 32.729 1071.17 -34.93 103.08 
1988 24 58.158 39.480 54.310 2949.55 -4.000 226.42 
1989 25 21.590 18.050 19.198 388.481 -6.030 53.900 
1990 25 -41.580 -43.540 9.473 89.737 -57.48 -18.23 
1991 25 -4.883 -5.890 10.108 102.180 -23.58 19.200 
1992 28 -21.891 -23.730 11.989 143.253 -43.25 0.000 
1993 25 14.253 13.070 14.188 201.292 -5.970 57.190 
1994 28 17.980 20.380 10.929 119.434 -8.190 34.110 
1995 28 3.1277 1.7450 13.801 190.489 -18.23 53.530 
1998 28 -3.718 -8.105 18.218 282.947 -25.29 52.050 
1997 28 -25.488 -27.725 22.619 511.808 -55.71 19.320 
Total 379 
Panel B: Second quartile 
Year N Mean Median Std.Dov. Var. Min. Max. 
1983 25 17.240 15.180 18.853 355.431 -12.57 85.270 
1984 25 6.8312 4.1100 18.822 282.964 -15.78 43.410 
1985 25 15.188 4.9200 31.342 982.345 -23.59 98.970 
1988 25 43.948 38.080 47.572 2283.10 -11.53 183.49 
1987 25 19.255 18.380 25.191 834.80 -19.83 74.480 
1988 24 77.179 50.875 74.991 5823.71 1.040 257.38 
1988 25 28.908 29.870 22.820 511.879 -15.21 89.950 
1990 25 -42.845 -45.190 10.871 113.880 -57.43 -12.50 
1991 25 -4.992 -8.940 14.484 208.214 -28.54 29.580 
1992 28 -24.919 -28.585 11.181 125.008 -45.93 2.8700 
1993 25 3.1804 -0.180 17.448 304.448 -18.08 53.450 
1994 26 21.482 21.285 14.882 214.977 -2.52 51.810 
1995 28 0.7758 -1.795 14.158 200.392 -21.83 44.470 
1998 28 -8.181 -10080 10.122 102.481 -23.88 18.390 
1997 28 -38.829 -46.275 28.997 728.821 -87.D4 29.830 
Total 379 
Panel C: Third quartile 
Year N Mean Median Std.Dev. Var. Min. Max. 
1983 25 30.8512 24.750 28.088 788.918 -2.280 112.88 
1984 25 9.72200 4.1800 20.095 403.821 -20.28 87.420 
1985 25 19.8738 7.0300 39.108 1529.24 -2.480 132.33 
1988 25 39.2432 24.410 43.150 1881.88 -17.92 183.05 
1987 25 35.2888 18.390 51.088 2807.78 -21.84 244.72 
1988 24 87.9998 83.880 35.517 1281.45 18.89 188.48 
1989 25 33.5228 29.770 27.883 785.147 -3.180 117.47 
1990 25 -45.828 -42.880 10.201 104.081 -62.38 -25.85 
1991 25 -3.8178 -8.1200 11.380 129.055 -21.37 18.280 
1992 28 -25.544 -28.930 11.790 138.991 -45.77 2.9000 
1993 25 7.40840 8.8700 18.440 340.018 -19.38 59.780 
1994 28 17.4238 18.175 19.802 384.242 -28.98 87.140 
1995 28 -3.3215 -3.185 10.909 119.002 -18.00 31.820 
1998 28 -11.845 -12.175 10.855 117.840 -31.25 8.1200 
1997 28 -34.782 -33.835 23.929 572.595 -68.23 10.710 
Total 379 
142 (536) ~ 46 ~ ~ 4 % 
Panel D: Bottom quartile (low cross-shareholding portfolio) 
Year N Moun Median Std.Dev. Var. Min. Max. 
1983 25 19.8458 18.590 23.293 542.557 -13.85 88.970 
1984 25 17.7564 9.8900 24.232 587.211 -18.02 79.930 
1985 25 32.0984 24.210 43.819 1920.12 -25.13 172.04 
1989 25 32.7880 30.090 34.999 1224.94 -34.92 102.35 
1987 25 44.6244 38.880 51.162 2617.54 -37.42 147.15 
1988 24 51.0475 47.770 34.104 1183.05 -18.27 148.02 
1989 25 45.2008 34.180 33,183 1101.10 -5.830 119.25 
1990 25 -47.468 -48.290 12.808 184.047 -64.68 -8.340 
1991 25 --0.3024 -1.0400 10.902 118.846 -17.55 22.780 
1992 28 -23.098 -28.095 18.109 259.504 -40,89 24.400 
1993 25 -2.17240 --0.2500 18.831 278.573 -38.13 41.580 
1994 26 22.8742 19.245 22.892 514,912 -7.240 59.900 
1995 28 --0.0892 -1.1450 15.383 238.830 -23.58 50.000 
1998 26 -13.832 -14.345 15.379 236.505 -44.92 23.750 
1997 28 -50.133 -54.890 19.735 389.477 -80.22 2.740 
Total 379 
(2001.iJ'- 3 J=120 B) 
